The Role of Brazil and the United States in the International Promotion of the Right to a Healthy Environment by Sampaio, José Adércio Leite & Costa, Beatriz Souza
University of Baltimore Journal of International Law
Volume 4




The Role of Brazil and the United States in the
International Promotion of the Right to a Healthy
Environment
José Adércio Leite Sampaio
Escola Superior Dom Helder Câmara, joseadercio.contato@gmail.com
Beatriz Souza Costa
Escola Superior Dom Helder Câmara, biaambiental@yahoo.com.br
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For
more information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sampaio, José Adércio Leite and Costa, Beatriz Souza (2016) "The Role of Brazil and the United States in the International Promotion




The Role of Brazil and the United States in the 
International Promotion of the Right to a Healthy 
Environment 
José Adércio Leite Sampaio,1 Beatriz Souza Costa2 
ABSTRACT: This article has the objective of analyzing the role 
played by Brazil and the United States in protecting the right to a 
healthy environment at an international level, especially at the World 
Trade Organization level. First, we must try to identify the fundamen-
tal right to a healthy environment, in its internal dimension and as a 
human right, at the international level. We used the bibliographic 
technique and deductive methodology to develop the research. The 
results at the conclusion evidence that the behavior of political and 
economic agents has a direct impact on the level of environmental 
protection. In the United States several draft bills were submitted to 
change trade laws under the argument that environmental protection 
would reduce competitiveness of national goods and services at the 
internal and the international levels. In Brazil there was a reduction of 
environmental protection, normative, and institutional instruments in 
order to stimulate the economy. In both countries however the role of 
higher or lower protagonism has also been directly related to the re-
quirements of economic sectors in the country. The supremacy of the 
economic interests is the reason why the global international system 
and especially WTO have not granted a suitable and effective treat-
ment to the right to a healthy environment. 
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I. Introduction 
 The environment is the world in which we live. A common-
place statement, although appropriate to the consideration that hu-
manity lives in the same space and uses, at least potentially, the same 
resources.  
 Environmental degradation is not a phenomenon that matters 
only to one country, one continent, or one terrestrial hemisphere. 
That objective connection sends us to an inter-subjectivity necessary 
to understand and deal with the problem generated by human activity. 
However, that inter-subjectivity comes into conflict with political 
borders and economic interests. If states, according to their conven-
ience and demands, tend to regulate the subject as monads, the task is 
made for failure. The issue requires other nations and peoples to con-
verge into the bases for sustainable development.  
 Here is the question asked in this paper: How should environ-
ment protection, internal and external systems, relate? This question 
demands a previous answer on the status given to environmental pro-
tection, its subjectivity as a power or right assigned to all on the 
common good of humanity; that is, a healthy and ecologically bal-
anced environment.  
 This paper defends the environment’s nature of human or fun-
damental right as the expression of a basic need for individuals; 
groups and nations; a plural right; and a multi-subjectivity that re-
quires assistance by a protection regime that meets its indivisible na-
ture. Next we must try to identify the barriers to the interconnection 
between the systems regarding both internal and international protec-
tion, making it difficult to have the necessary treatment for the indi-
visibility of phenomena—i.e. global heating; depletion of the ozone 
layer; and pollution of the oceans, air, and land. Nevertheless, there 
are elements that ease matching the two systems that try to recover 
the sense of unity imposed by living on the same planet. We try to 
identify the arguments that help in understanding why states resist the 
obvious.  
 The paper also presents an approach about the role played by 
Brazil and the United States in both senses—to approximate and to 
move environmental protection instruments for national and interna-
tional systems apart. Those theoretical explanations are tested to re-
veal what moves one and the other to act both as a part or monad and 
as a whole. 
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II. The Right to a Healthy Environment: A Human Right and a 
Fundamental Right3 
 There are dogmatic and material arguments that support the 
definition of the right to a healthy environment or, as the Brazilian 
constitutional law states it, ecologically balanced environment—both 
as a human right in its international perspective and as a fundamental 
right in its internal definition.4 The dogmatic arguments are based on 
the existence of several agreements, declarations, covenants, and in-
ternational treaties that recognize it in general5 and specific6 aspects. 
It is also foreseen in constitutions and declared by the constitutional 
jurisprudence of several states.7 
 Material fundamentals are identified by consensus at a state 
and international community level. The environment is interpreted as 
a moral value that requires due protection by the legal systems.8 That 
moral value may be primary, recognizing the environment as a valu-
able good in itself according to the line defended by the different 
trends that form the bio-centric ethics or the so-called “deep ecolo-
gy;” or it may be a secondary or instrumental value, although legally 
and politically essential due to its indispensability for human life on 
 
 3. We are going to use both “right to a healthy environment” and “right to an ecological-
ly balanced environment,” the terminology that is used by the 1988 Brazilian Constitu-
tion. CONSTITUIÇĀO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Refer, for example, to regional instruments of human rights such as the Additional 
Protocol to the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the African Letter for the Human Rights and its Additional Protocol 
on the Rights of Women. Within the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the Convention on the Rights of Children set forth the right to the highest level 
possible of health. Under PIDESC, the right to health includes the obligation to pro-
mote environmental health to protect citizens against environmental risks to health to 
insure healthy work conditions and secure the right to safe food and drinkable water. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 6. Among several documents, we list the Convention for the International Trade of En-
dangered Forest Fauna and Flora Species (CITES), Board Convention on Weather 
Changes (UNFCCC), Convention on the Access to Information and Public Participa-
tion in the Decision Process and Access to Justice in Environmental Issues (Conven-
tion of Aarhus). 
 7. CONSTITUIÇĀO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.). 
 8. JOHN BENSON, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH READINGS 1 (2000). 
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Earth.9 However, there would be difficulties of a liberal order regard-
ing its categorization especially at a fundamental right level. As a 
“collective right” or “community good,” the healthy environment 
could not technically be considered a right with a fundamental sta-
tus.10 Evidence of this is the impossibility that a good belonging to all 
could be a protection for the minority as opposed to the majority.  
 Authors such as Beatriz Costa understand the ecologically bal-
anced environment as a fundamental right due to several aspects 
listed in the 1988 Federal Constitution.11  That is the right of all in-
cluded in Article 5, Item § 2, and also Article 1, Item §3, in which the 
dignity of the human being is deeply connected to the healthy envi-
ronment.12 The author affirms “in Brazil, there is no doubt that the 
environment is considered a fundamental right, because any interpre-
tation another way had not found support in the Federal constitu-
tion.”13 Those difficulties are confronted by the conclusion that the 
harmful effects of environmental disturbance fall especially over 
more vulnerable people, including poorer populations, traditional and 
native communities, ethnic minorities, women, the elderly and chil-
dren.14 There would be a social division of the environmental damage 
or of the polluted environment.15  
 In the face of diffuse consequences such as global heating and 
the hole in the ozone layer, in the short run, people having higher 
purchase power would be able to neutralize them or at least reduce 
the harm.16 It is liberal criticism that does not change the nature of 
other possible theoretical interpretations such as the communitarian 
one, and even some republican trends, that do not deny collective 
rights as the characteristic of being fundamental. 
 
 9. Id. at 119; see also, DAVID R. KELLER, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: THE BIG QUESTION 235 
(David R. Keller ed., 2010).  
 10. BENSON, supra note 8, at 123.   
 11. BEATRIZ SOUZA COSTA, MEIO AMBIENTE COMO DIREITO À VIDA: BRASIL, PORTUGAL & 
ESPANHA [ENVIRONMENT AS RIGHT TO LIFE: BRAZIL, PORTUGAL & SPAIN] 60 (2nd ed. 
2013). 
 12. CONSTITUIÇĀO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 1, 5 (Braz.). 
 13. COSTA, supra note 11. 
 14. Francis O. Adeola, Cross-National Environmental Injustice and Human Rights Issues 
A Review of Evidence in the Developing World, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 686 (2000). 
 15. Id. Many studies demonstrate that perverse social division. See also “What Will Hap-
pen if Hunger Comes?” Abuses against the Indigenous Peoples of Ethiopia’s Lower 
Omo Valley HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Jun. 2012). 
 16. Adeola, supra note 14. 
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 In practice, however, international or not, agencies and gov-
ernments structure environmental issues at a human and fundamental 
right level, each one of them at its own level, or they otherwise do it 
superficially or even in a diversionist way. International laws and 
regulations are important tools to protect the environment but, in 
general, when they address the subject, they tend to concentrate in 
technical regulatory aspects as well as in certain ecologic processes.17 
At that pace, governments are not able to solve the impacts of envi-
ronmental disturbance on human rights in a comprehensive way.18 
 It is important to note that in 2012, the UN’s Council for Hu-
man Rights assigned “its first independent expert to develop studies 
and reports on compliance with human rights liabilities related to a 
safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.”19 Maybe one of its 
most important tasks is to help define the content of the human right 
to a healthy environment and to define instruments that secure the ef-
fective exercise of it. 
 Despite the difficulties, there is an increasing trend to treat the 
environment at a human and constitutional right level. Interconnec-
tions concerning that phenomenon are remarkable and expected with-
in nations as well as internationally. Local contexts and even histori-
cal circumstances certainly modulate the intensity and the way the 
State contributes for that process of international confirmation of the 
right to a healthy environment. On the other hand, it goes through in-
ternational progress and withdrawal influxes. However, the study of 
the subject is going to be limited to the United States and Brazil. But 
that is a circumscription that may help understand what happens in 
other places due to convergences and differences between the two 
countries.  
 
 17. An example that is always remembered is the Convention of Stockholm on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants. Georg Karlaganis et al., The Elaboration of the ‘Stockholm Con-
vention’ on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs): a Negotiation Process Fraught 
with Obstacles and Opportunities, 8(3) ENVTL SCI. & POLLUTION RES. 216 (2001). 
 18. Juliane Kippenberg & Jane Cohen, Lives in the Balance: The Human Cost of Envi-
ronmental Neglect, HUMAN RTS. WATCH 41, 48 (2013). 
 19. H.R.C. Res. 19/10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/19/10 (Apr. 19, 2012). 
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III. Interconnections Between Internal and International 
Protection to the Right to a Healthy Environment 
 In a globalized world, it is almost impossible for states to make 
environmental policy decisions without taking into account the inter-
national scenario and contexts. Technical and economic reasons ex-
plain that behavior. In general, the use of stricter instruments for do-
mestic environmental protection raises two major concerns. The first 
is on the effectiveness of the measures and the second, the impact 
produced on the competitiveness of the country and its companies.20  
 Thus, the first one is based on the limitation that hinders states 
to combat isolated problems such as global heating, air pollution, or 
the destruction of the ozone layer.21 The second one relates to the rel-
ative increase of operational costs and of the production of goods and 
services for companies in states that adopt more restrictive environ-
mental measures.22 They run the risk of seeing their products get 
more expensive in the external and internal market and, as a conse-
quence, lose businesses.23 
 The internal behavior of political and economic agents produce 
important effects at an international level.24 Also regulatory measures 
and actions adopted by the international community end up produc-
ing important consequences domestically, sometimes beyond what is 
reasonably predictable.25 Let us give an example by telling a story 
that took place in the end of the 1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s. 
Over thirty draft bills were submitted to the United States Congress 
in order to change trade laws due to complaints that the environmen-
tal legislation in force was reducing the competitiveness of the goods 
produced in the country.26 The purpose of the drafts was to force oth-
er countries to effectively adopt environmental protection standards 
that were similar to the North American ones or even the ones inter-
 
 20. Mary E. O’Connell, Using Trade to Enforce International Environmental Law: Impli-
cations for United States Law, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 273 (1994). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahtoranta, The Interest-Based Explanation of International 
Environmental Policy, 48(1) INT’L ORG. 77 (1994).  
 24. Id. 103-104. 
 25. Id.  
 26. O’Connell, supra note 20. 
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nationally approved.27 The penalty could be the impossibility to ac-
cess the North American market or the increase of import charges.28 
 Most of those initiatives failed to progress and some were con-
verted into laws.29 The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) 
changed the law for the protection of marine mammals.30 Approved 
in 1972, the MMPA impacted fishermen in the country by limiting 
the number of dolphins that could be slaughtered annually due to tuna 
fishing.31 As a result of the limitation, fishermen complained about 
the import of fish from places where such restriction was not in 
place.32 With the changes to the MMPA, especially in 1988, fish from 
countries that did not adopt restrictive measures were not allowed to 
enter the North American territory.33 
 Under a judicial order, the North American government em-
bargoed the import of tuna captured by Mexican fishermen.34 In the 
face of the embargo, Mexico appealed to General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) to claim a violation.35 The decision was in 
Mexico’s favor; therefore, the United States was forced to suspend 
the embargo.36 The unilaterally was deemed harmful to free trade, 
thus unacceptable, even though correct from the environmental 
standpoint.37 
 The decision guided many other judgments by GATT and its 
successor, World Trade Organization (WTO). The convergence of 
the humanitarian market reserve and environmental protection pro-
duced a series of relevant events for the internal and international en-
vironment protection system.38 Some of them were positive, but oth-
ers were not. The study of the reasons for the convergence between 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Geoffrey W. Levin, The Environment and Trade: A Multilateral Imperative, 1 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 231 (1992). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (a preliminary 
measure had been granted by a District Court in California in 1990 and it was submit-
ted to an appeal by the North American government.) 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Mexico etc versus US: “Tuna Dolphin,” WTO (Sep. 3, 1991). 
 38. Id. 
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normative systems points at multifactorial elements and a higher or a 
lower emulative or mimetic tendency or the coercive submission 
among them,39 existence of communication and interaction net-
works,40 and of crossed political and economic pressures.41 Theoreti-
cal guidance is added to economic or cultural bias when trying to find 
the reason for the behavior of the United States in the creation of an 
integrated internal and international system for environmental protec-
tion.  
 However, despite the complexity of the mechanisms that relate 
to both protection systems, we are able to notice two kinds of diffi-
culty to obtain institutional isomorphism: the normative one from the 
international community, called “centripetal obstacles” and the other 
one, resulting from the internal environment of states or, in compari-
son, called “centrifugal obstacles.” There is an important counter-
positioning element against the forces that dissipate the encounter be-
tween the two systems: the civil society and the internal, trans-
frontier that mobilizes cooperation and makes both act as multi-
directional facilitators. 
a. Centripetal Difficult Forces 
 At the international level, the right to a healthy environment is 
subject to the vicissitudes of a non-systematic treatment of interna-
tional human rights, international protection system, and economic 
logic within the WTO. 
i. The Right to a Healthy Environment Within the International Law 
for Human Rights 
  The global system for the protection of rights has not given the 
appropriate treatment to the right to a healthy environment. It certain-
ly has difficulties, but when it consistently fails to include environ-
mental protection in its agenda, it ends up by reducing itself.  Envi-
ronmental problems reflect on several aspects to human life, from 
liberty to equality and health to education. Even if regulations are not 
 
 39. PAUL J. DIMAGGIO & WALTER W. POWELL, NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds. 1991). 
 40. Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Dif-
fusion in the International Political Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 171 (2004). 
 41. George Hoberg, Globalization and Policy Convergence: Symposium Overview, 3 J. 
COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS: RES.& PRAC. 127 (2001).  
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seen as proper law, an assessment of the nuclear elements is neces-
sary.  
 People who live in an environmentally disturbed area are not 
duly respected in regards to their dignity. The inaccurate treatment 
that is given to the subject reflects the low systematic number of ap-
proved international agreements and treaties.  Areas that are both 
blank and overlapped generate a loss of normative content and effi-
ciency. The complexity of the subject already creates obstacles to set-
ting conceptual units and the lack of normative syntonic creates more 
difficulties. The multiplicity of international documents results in ad-
ditional costs for state administration, not only because they require 
extra internal coordination work, but also because they require follow 
up actions and negotiations within international and regional organ-
isms. 
 The fragmented treatment currently given to those problems 
only postpones the inevitable consideration of the environment as a 
true human right. The wasted time may result in additional costs. It is 
more than time that the international law for human rights takes over 
the task of defining the content and the structure of the right to a 
healthy environment, reinforcing its institution by means of mecha-
nisms aimed at people, groups, or states that, for action or omission, 
start environmental crises.42 While the international law for human 
rights fails in that mission, environmental protection at a global level 
is subject to the changes and desires of economy revealed by the ex-
perience of GATT and its successor, WTO. 
ii. The Right to a Healthy Environment Within the World Trade 
Organization. 
 Efforts led by the United States to rebuild commercial ties be-
tween nations after the Second World War resulted in the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).43 That agreement estab-
lished a set of standards to reduce tariff barriers to trade at a global 
level.44 
 
 42. Kippenberg & Cohen, supra note 18. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
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 In that document, the environment was only mentioned in Ar-
ticle 20 of GATT as an exception to free trade rules.45 According to 
the article, countries are able to create measures “necessary to protect 
human, animal or vegetal life and health” or “related to the conserva-
tion of non-renewable natural resources” because those measures do 
not correspond to unfair discrimination against foreign products or 
operate in a restrictive and dissimulated way over trade.46  
 We notice that the interest was little and the subject was in 
standby until the 1970s, when it effectively became part of GATT’s 
concerns, especially with the creation of the Group on Environmental 
Measures and International Trade (EMIT Group), with the document 
called “Control of Industrial Pollution and International Trade” and 
the debates and results of the Tokyo Round of commercial negotia-
tions (1973-1979).47 However, the concern was not exactly environ-
mental protection, but the negative impacts of protection measures 
adopted by states on international trade.  Exceptions to Article 20 
should be duly treated to avoid becoming rules.48 
 Another sign of that preference, trade over the environment, 
can be identified in the decisions made when solving conflicts be-
tween countries. The case of the dolphins between the United States 
and Mexico sets the pace of the preference.49 According to the group 
that decided it, exceptions to trade foreseen in Article 20 should be 
interpreted restrictively.50 In addition, the United States had not evi-
denced that the prohibition to import tuna was “necessary;” it was the 
less restrictive way for trade to protect dolphins.51 
 The United States could have obtained the same objective 
through agreements with other countries. Finally, North Americans 
could not use the exceptions in Article 20 to regulate natural re-
sources outside the borders of the country. To summarize, the United 
States had used an unjustified discriminatory measure against Mexi-
 
 45. WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WTO  (2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm [hereinaf-
ter WTO Rules]. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Early Years: Emerging Environment Debate in GATT/WTO, WTO  (2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm.  
 48. WTO Rules, supra note 45.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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cans. The conclusion could have been different if environmental pro-
tection was a priority or, at least placed at the same level of trade 
promotion.52  
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in January 
1995 as one of the main measures of the last round of GATT carried 
out in Uruguay between 1986 and 1994.53 The WTO was established 
as a permanent organization and it maintained most of GATT’s prin-
ciples.54 It has its own legal personality with member states and cus-
toms unions integrated in.55 Institutionalism and permanence make 
the WTO different from its predecessor. Objectives were also added 
to include the trade of goods, the trade of services, and the protection 
of industrial property.56 The environment was expressly mentioned in 
the introduction of WTO’s Institutive as one of the Parties’ consider-
anda.57 The economic activity would have to take place through the 
“optimal use of global resources according to the objective of sus-
tainable development and trying to protect and preserve the environ-
ment.”58  
 Among the agencies that form the structure of the WTO is the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), which aims at concili-
ating trade demands and environment protection to allow for the 
 
52. R. Kenton Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT-Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Up-
date, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957 (1993).  According to the panel: “The Panel consid-
ered that if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States 
were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health 
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without 
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would 
then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting par-
ties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number 
of contracting parties with identical internal regulations.” Id.  
 53. Who We Are, WTO (2016), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. What Are Intellectual Property Rights?, WTO (2016), 
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm.  
 57. The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO (2016), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm. 
 58. Agreement Establishing the WTO, WTO AGREEMENT SERIES 1 (2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries1_wto_e.pdf. 
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promotion of sustainable development.59 Since the creation of the 
WTO, eight Ministerial Conferences have occurred: Singapore in 
1996; Geneva in 1998; Seattle in 1999; Doha in 2001; Cancun in 
2003; Hong Kong in 2005; Geneva in 2009-2011; and Bali in 2013.60 
However, the CTE’s recommendations have not led to any relevant 
changes regarding the multilateral trade system in what touches the 
environment, although they have been considered.61 In the first Con-
ference, the commitment to the sustainable use of natural resources 
and to clean economic development was reaffirmed.62 At the same 
time, the cooperation between intergovernmental environmental or-
ganizations such as the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) was stimulated.63  
 However, negotiation rounds that followed it only rhetorically 
claimed that the promotion of global trade was compatible with the 
requirements of sustainable development. The practical results were 
unsatisfactory. The evidence shows that, although stimulated by the 
WTO, multilateral agreements concerning the environment still fail 
to receive normative treatment within the WTO. These results are not 
part of Attachment I to the Agreement that created it, and although 
they could be included into its legal order through the application of 
Article 5 of the Agreement, the members have not officially ad-
dressed the inclusion of these results.64  
 That deficit of normativity reflects on the cases that were as-
sessed via WTO litigation, and the fundament of the decision rarely 
 
 59. The Committee on Trade and Environment (‘regular’ CTE), WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
3, 2016).  
 60. Ministerial Conferences, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 
2016). The Ministerial Conference, integrated by the members of WTO, is the body 
that makes the most important decisions within the Organization, including subjects in 
any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. 
 61. See generally LENORE SEK, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: BACKGROUND AND 
ISSUES (2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57791.pdf.  
 62. Id. at 6. 
 63. The WTO and United Nations Environment Programme, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_unep_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 
2016).   
 64. See HENRIK HORN, PETROS V. MAVROIDIS, & ANDRÉ SAPIR, BEYOND THE WTO? AN 
ANATOMY OF EU AND US PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 3-7 (Andrew Fielding ed., 
2009), http://goo.gl/e6EenU. 
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resorts to one of those agreements.65 As illustrated above, environ-
mental protection is interpreted by Article 20 of GATT as an excep-
tion to free trade.66 The legal dispute between the United States and 
Mexico concerning tuna showed how the nature of that exception at-
tracts restrictive interpretation, to the detriment of the environment. 
That guidance has not changed even after WTO committed itself to 
the environmental cause.   
 Very recently, the subject was revisited after Mexico raised a 
new claim against the United States. This new claim was raised to 
check compliance with the North American requirement that packag-
es of tuna sold in the country were properly labeled to state the tuna 
was fished without posing risks to dolphins.67 The panel understood 
that the required labeling was more restrictive to trade than necessary 
to meet the legitimate objectives of (i) making sure that consumers 
were not deceived or deluded about dolphin slaughter due to tuna 
fishing; and (ii) contributing to protect the dolphins, making sure that 
the North American market is not used to incentivize fishing fleets 
capture tuna and threaten the life of dolphins.68 This idea has been re-
iterated since the WTO’s first decisions. 
 In Venezuela, Brazil v. United States, the complaint was sup-
ported by a regulation approved by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives 
founded on the 1990 Clean Air Act that set forth base toxicity levels 
for imported gasoline.69 Refineries in the country were in charge of 
establishing those toxicity levels, which would in practice result in a 
differentiated and more onerous treatment in regards to the external 
product, as compared to the internal one. 
 
 65. See id. at 20-23. 
 66. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT, ARTICLE XX – 
GENERAL EXCEPTIONS 562-97 (n.d.), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art20_e.pdf.  
 67. United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
3, 2016). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Venezuela, Brazil versus US: gasoline, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis07_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).   
The Role of Brazil and the United States Vol. IV, No. II 
 39 
 In that case, Article III § 4 issued by GATT-94 would have 
been violated.70 The United States responded, arguing that the meas-
ure was necessary in order to reduce the emissions in the atmosphere 
of toxic substances resulting from gasoline combustion.71 Neverthe-
less, the WTO decided in favor of the plaintiffs.72 The North Ameri-
cans had not proven that the environmental exception imposed was 
the least restrictive possible means to facilitate trade.73 Also, unjusti-
fied discrimination had been promoted between the national and the 
imported product. According to the WTO, the measure created a dis-
guised and unjustifiable restriction to the international trade under the 
excuse of promoting the environment.74 
 However, the outlook is not entirely grim. In another case that 
was evaluated by the WTO, the United States was questioned by var-
ious countries, including Malaysia and Thailand, because the United 
States’ legislation, among other restrictions, forbids the sale of 
shrimp captured by nets that would not allow for marine turtles to es-
cape from them.75 For the United States, the requirement was a neces-
sary instrument for the protection of marine turtles, which were on 
the list of endangered species issued by the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES).76 For the plaintiffs, it was a unilateral measure against 
GATT.77 However, the WTO had a different understanding of the sit-
uation; unilaterally, it was not considered reason enough to say that 
the impugned measure is inconsistent with GATT, and the WTO did 
not find unjustified discrimination had occurred.78 Additionally, dis-
tinguished from the Dolphin-Tuna Case I, it was allowed to restrict 
import based on its production process, instead of restricting import 
based on the product itself.79 Furthermore, the WTO used a multilat-
eral agreement that defended the environment, which rarely happens. 
 
 70. Id.   
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 10, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996).. 
 75. See generally id. 
 76. Id. at ¶  6. 
 77. Id. at ¶  9. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at ¶  14. 
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 In a later dispute, the European Union sued Brazil because 
Brazilian laws forbid the import of used and refurbished tires.80 How-
ever, this prohibition did not apply against the countries in the Mer-
cosur.81 Brazil claimed to be protecting the environment, and justified 
the exception by asserting that the imports from the Mercosur only 
compromised a small percentage of total imports into Brazil.82 The 
WTO recognized that the prohibition against the import of used or re-
furbished tires was justifiable due to the protection of the environ-
ment, as well as public health and safety.83 However, the exception 
was not accepted once it was considered unjustifiable discrimina-
tion.84 
 Regardless, it would be premature to say that the WTO has 
surrendered to the evidence of the environmental problem. Economic 
and pragmatic interests still prevail over the need to protect the envi-
ronment. The limited number of cases decided in favor of the ecolog-
ical issues, the lack of normativity within the WTO, and the lack of 
international treaties and conventions on the subject are still reasons 
for pessimistic conclusions which, in face of the Doha Round—
where an approximation between WTO’s agreements and the agree-
ments of other international organisms was tested with an environ-
mental objective—still have no prospect of reversal.85  
 At the very least, the little dialogue between those organisms is 
a problem when obtaining reasonable levels of environmental protec-
tion. It is a greater problem when recognizing the right to a healthy 
environment. Approximation initiatives between the WTO, regional 
agencies, and the United Nations for Human Rights are still shy when 
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we think about the challenges ahead. Without understating, it is a 
matter of survival. 
iii. The Hindering Centrifugal Forces 
 The countries pose difficulty in achieving international protec-
tion for the right to a healthy environment. Economic and geopoliti-
cal interests tend to guide the external politics of each country, inter-
fering with the guidance adopted in international forums. Thus, 
peculiarities of the legal and political systems of the states may solid-
ify the adoption of environmental standards and parameters they 
agree to follow. The diversity of maturity stages regarding legal insti-
tutions, associated to political cultures, may delay or even hinder the 
harmonization of the protection mechanisms. The subject would cer-
tainly require more detail, but the aim of this article is to assist rela-
tions between the Federal government and subnational entities, and 
between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial branches, as 
they define and carry out environmental public policies. Another el-
ement that may interfere in the process is the recognition of a funda-
mental right to a healthy environment. The Constitution is a key ele-
ment to establishing or, at least, canalizing the forces that work on the 
interrelation between the internal system and the international system 
for the protection of the environment. 
iv. Environmental Federalism  
 In both the United States and Brazil, federal and state efforts to 
protect the environment are cooperative in nature, which is a positive 
element for the committal of internationally agreed engagements.86 
Nevertheless, conflicts are not rare.  In the United States, the increas-
ing federal regulation on the issue is subject to severe criticism, espe-
cially from state authorities. For example, there has been controversy 
between the federal and state control over the extraction of schist 
oil.87 The states claimed exclusive attribution on the subject and 
strongly protested against the intention of making it federal.88 
 
 86. See generally Roberton C. Williams III, Growing State-Federal Conflicts in Environ-
mental Policy: The Role of Market-Based Regulation, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1092 (2012). 
 87. Albert C. Lin, Fracking and Federalism: A Comparative Approach to Reconciling Na-
tional and Subnational Interests in the United States and Spain, 44 ENVTL. L. 1039 
(2014). 
 88. Id. 
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 In general, it is said that the hypertrophy of the federal gov-
ernment hinders the suitable and efficient management of environ-
mental policies by the states and local powers. The centralization of 
the environmental policy does not hinder the state competence, since 
the complementary standards set forth stricter protection standards.89 
Concerning recent state complaints, articulation and incentive formu-
las have been used so that state legislations follow the federal model, 
especially in those fields in which the trade clause is not involved.90 
 Environmental executive federalism has been criticized due to 
the expenses it generates for subnational bodies. Between 2000 and 
2010, state cashboxes were burdened by at least $23 billion US dol-
lars due to the main regulations adopted by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) during that period.91 The Supreme Court has 
been called to give an opinion about possible centralizing excesses by 
the federal government but it generally has maintained an approval of 
the federal standard.92 
 Brazil’s legal system is facing similar controversy. The consti-
tution tasks all federal bodies to promote a healthy environment.93 
Legislative environmental competence is also shared.94 The federal 
government is in charge of deciding general standards, where states 
and cities, when appropriate, have the complementary competence.95  
 Competence is significantly reduced once the constitution pri-
vately assigns the federal government authority concerning civil, 
trade, and procedural law, etc.96 That is why many state laws, some 
stricter than the federal laws, have been declared unconstitutional by 
the supreme federal court. For example, the Court “prohibited the use 
 
 89. Williams III, supra note 86. 
 90. Id. 
 91. WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 42 (2014). 
 92. Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Ad-
ministration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41(4) ADMIN. L. REV. 549 
(1989); Joseph F. Zimmermann, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE 
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of products, materials or artifacts that contain any type of asbestos in 
the state of São Paulo.”97  
 However, that centralizing trend in the field of material compe-
tences has been seriously reduced through federal laws that forward 
execution, including environmental permitting processes, to the states 
and cities. The competence transferring or returning process is not 
always followed by the allocation of resources, which has generated 
strong criticism against local governments. For environmentalist sec-
tors, executive decentralization may increase the effectiveness of en-
vironmental standards, both the ones foreseen in the domestic legisla-
tion and the ones taken over externally. Due to that fact, it is said that 
decentralization has been taking place in a disorderly manner, with-
out any planning or articulation regarding the three spheres of gov-
ernment. The picture is further aggravated when we consider the sig-
nificant differences between the normative and the administrative 
systems of the several federative agencies, some of which lack the 
structure to carry out the task, in addition to being easier for the deci-
sion process to be coopted by the economic power. 
 The dependence of the legislature is another element that cre-
ates difficulty of making commitments to agreements already adopted 
and promotes changes regarding the external policies on the subject.  
In Brazil, an environmental treaty or agreement depends on approval 
by the National Congress to be part of the internal legal order, as in 
the United States.98 Aside from that, there is always the possibility 
that the Legislature approves laws that deviate from international 
standards for the protection of the environment, even for worse. The 
internal hierarchy of treaties may aggravate that picture. In case there 
is no hierarchy, the later law revokes provisions in a treaty that inte-
grates the legal order. The subject is delicate in the United States be-
cause of popular sovereignty.99 
 In Brazil the situation is less complicated. Human rights trea-
ties have a supra legal position in case they are not incorporated as a 
 
 97. R.S.T.F.-SP, ADI 3937, Realtor: Min. Marco Aurelio, 4.6.2008, 103, DIÁRIO DA 
JUSTIÇA [D.J.], 16.6.2008  (Braz.). 
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constitutional amendment, preventing laws to revoke them.100  The 
issue is knowing what discipline on the environment integrates the 
right to a healthy or ecologically balanced environment, and thus, 
what is placed outside the legislative provision and only reports to 
merely administrative tasks that could, in theory, be changed. The use 
of the social environmental non-retroactivity principle, which, in its 
most requiring perspective, prevents changes that directly or indirect-
ly aggravate the environmental protection system is increasing in the 
country, especially within the doctrine.101 However, it is not universal 
insurance against legislative changes, especially in economic crisis 
periods. 
 Even if express constitutional recognition of the right to a 
healthy or ecologically balanced environment tends to reduce argu-
mentative requirements for the approval of measures aimed at pro-
tecting ecologic processes, it is necessary to consider and to promote 
sustainable development. There is no device on that purpose in the 
United States and not even recognition by means of interpretative 
construction by the Supreme Court, and as a consequence, it is not a 
constitutional right. In Brazil, Article 225 of the 1988 Federal Consti-
tution states:  
“All have the right to an ecologically balanced environment, a 
common use good and essential for a healthy quality of life. The Pub-
lic Power and the collectivity have the obligation to defend and pre-
serve it for the present and future generations.”102 
 It is certainly an important legal contribution to stimulate gov-
ernors to take over external commitments for the protection of the 
environment, as well as to facilitate for its possible integration to the 
domestic order.  Politics, however, is not always limited to the law.  
v. Multi-Dimensional Facilitating Forces 
 Environmental law and policies tend to progress when the civil 
society is involved, and at the same time, when states agree to collab-
orate more than compete. 
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vi. The Participation of the Civil Society  
 Entrusting the destiny of humanity to institutionalized repre-
sentatives of the state power is not a guarantee that an efficient inter-
national environment protection system is going to be used. Besides 
the critical elements of the popular representation mechanism itself, 
economic and geopolitical interests end up interfering in deliberative 
processes.  Discovering the civil society as an indispensable instru-
ment is not only beneficial for democratic legitimation, but also for 
the control and effectiveness of the execution of public policies, in 
which liberals and republicans agree.103 The phenomenon is not only 
restricted to states, it is internationally expressed.104  
 The progress of communication that technology allows for the 
creation of forums, discussion, and articulation networks on many 
subjects, including environmental ones, makes it easier to spread the 
information and to organize events at the same time everywhere on 
the planet, to have a common agenda for claims, and to strengthen 
globalized environmental movements.105 In earlier times, non-formal 
spaces were defended to spread collective ideas and projects to coun-
ter-arrest the corporatism of national parliaments. With democratic 
gains, we can now say the same to the international community in the 
face of multi-lateral organisms and multi-national companies.106 
 That stimulus to social participation can be reinforced by the 
constitutions of the countries. In Brazil, the constitutional text creates 
real social participation and right promotion tasks, for example, the 
ones having a social bias such as health and education, as well as a 
collective bias such as the right to an ecologically balanced environ-
ment.107 It also assigns power for the citizen to petition, represent, and 
control acts performed by public agents and also to impugn them ju-
dicially through a civil suit for the violation of environmental protec-
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tion obligations.108 The United States Constitution also stimulates the 
participation of individuals and groups in the deliberative processes 
of the country. That happens, not expressly, but by recognizing the 
freedom of speech and of press, the freedom of association and as-
sembly, and the right to petition associated with a culture of vindica-
tion and defense of what de Tocqueville called “well understood in-
terest.”109  
 It is right that those participation loci are also available for oc-
cupation by the defects of formal deliberative processes and the ex-
planation is not a complex one. Different interests of both a moral 
and altruistic nature, and an economic and egotistic aspect intersect in 
the exercise of participative competences. Environmental policy for-
mulators cannot disregard that plurality of voices, which results in 
reduced expectations regarding original projects and plans. Instead of 
having a technically ideal solution for problems, we end up obtaining 
a hybrid product of arrangements, commitments, and various consen-
suses from the different actors and interests involved.110 
 The environment of dialogue and conflagration has caused en-
vironmentalists to adopt negotiation strategies with some pragma-
tism, so as to get the more beneficial alternative, even if it is not ide-
al, for environmental preservation.111 To abandon the table of 
negotiations would be a formula for failure for the intended policy; 
however, to stay in it is a sign of the agony of the idealized policy.112 
 That happens not only in the legislative process (for example, 
the current Brazilian Forest Code, Law 12.651/2012), but also along 
the execution of the laws. This is more visible in the center of envi-
ronmental public hearings so much that, most of the time, it reduces, 
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but does not prevent environmental damages due to projects that from 
the strict standpoint of environmental protection should not receive a 
permit.113 Even with that bias of pragmatism, social movements are 
indispensable for the promotion of internal and international envi-
ronment protection policies. Difficulties and deviations faced from 
that movement tend to be overcome by education provided by the de-
liberative process itself. The union of environment and democracy is 
the hope for a better world. 
vii. International Cooperation  
 Environmental problems concerned with the reduction of the 
ozone layer and loss of biodiversity are the result of human action 
and its impacts can also be felt all over the world; fighting or manag-
ing it depends on the cooperation of all countries. Deficits of dialogue 
between international environment protection agencies clash with the 
effectiveness of its regulations and policies, making the economic 
logic prevail over eco-protection needs. 
 Economic theory and practice teach that, in the absence of co-
operation, each country and each economic agent tends to maximize 
his own net benefits of cost reduction by using environmental poli-
cies.114 By doing so, they stimulate international competition that has 
deleterious consequences for the environment.115 Several studies indi-
cate that the lack of natural resources and environmental disturbance 
may be reasons for conflicts and even wars, and may also contribute 
to stimulating the cooperation between countries.116 The more coop-
eration that occurs, the higher the damage and the lower the resource 
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availability.117 There is still the variable imposed by the higher or 
lower return given by those resources so profitable that raw inputs 
tend to stimulate cooperative attitudes to stabilize markets and pric-
es.118 
 There is also an ingredient added by the diversity of political 
and normative systems and structures between the countries that have 
already been addressed above.119 Those economic and institutional 
readings require a complement that is supplied by a culture of human 
coexistence that is not only based on the homo economicus.120 Moti-
vations of human actions and, inductively, of states, can be due to 
other reasons such as moral and political ones.121 
 Regardless of the direction one may follow, it is agreed that the 
cooperation fomented by international organisms shall take place 
through equalitarian bases, always considering the existing differ-
ences regarding the economic and social development between coun-
tries. The asymmetries have to be taken into account to coordinate the 
actions of international players. Adopting the hegemonic positions of 
more developed states ends up by making agreements or their effec-
tiveness impossible.122 
 The paralysis of WTO in the Doha round is an example. One 
cannot forget that it is healthy to include the private sector in that 
scenario, since its economic interests do not overlap the purpose of 
protection and the voice of the countries under development. The use 
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of certifications from “businesses friend of environment” through an 
expedient such as ISO 14000 tends to contribute to the process, since 
it does not mean a privatization of the protection parameters them-
selves at the expense of the deliberative power of the states, especial-
ly the poorer ones, and the claims of the globalized civil society.123 
 The international cooperation is cause-and-effect, as one can 
notice, in terms of the approximation of the internal and international 
systems to protect the right to a healthy environment. 
IV. The Role of the United States and Brazil in the International 
Protection of Environmental and Human Rights 
 The protagonism of the United States in the international poli-
cy of human rights and the defense of the environment is the foreseen 
result of its condition of economic, military, and cultural power.  
 Brazil has played the international role of hosting large confer-
ences; however, when applying the existing legislation in favor of 
environmental protection, it also collides with economic interests. 
a. The United States and International Protection of Human 
and Environmental Rights 
 At the end of the 1960’s and beginning of the 1970’s, the Unit-
ed States led the efforts for international agreements and treaties on 
the environment to be signed.124 Treaties such as the 1972 Conven-
tion of London on ocean dumping, the 1972 Convention on World 
Heritage, the 1973 Convention on the International Trade of Endan-
gered Species, and the 1978 MARPOL Protocol on the Pollution by 
Ships were the direct products of that effort.125 
 However, the work of the United States is mostly guided by its 
strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests, resulting in some con-
tradictory actions. The protagonism it adopted during that time, for 
most of the literature, was a result of the need to induce the other 
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countries to adopt the strict and expensive environmental legislation 
that, due to internal movements, it had approved.126 The concern was 
more to equalize the cost of its products in the market than to con-
vince others of the social, economic, and even ethical problem that 
the environmental issue raised.127 There were also explanations for 
the withdrawal promoted by the country to ratify multilateral agree-
ments, especially on the environment, after the end of the Cold War. 
  For example, the United States failed to ratify the 1989 Basel 
Convention on the Disposal of Hazardous Waste, the 1992 Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, the 1991 Kyoto Protocol on Weather 
Changes, the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the 2001 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.128 The Unit-
ed States’ main concern is the defense of the internal interests of its 
producers and convincing commercial partners through unilateral 
sanctions.129 The almost unconditional support to multilateral adjust-
ment for the liberalization of trade such as WTO and NAFTA is an 
exception.130  
 It is clear that the external North American politics assumes 
the promotion of Human Rights, in general, and of the quality of the 
environment as one of its main objectives.131 However, the words and 
intentions declared do not always result in the attitudes and initiatives 
taken.  
 On that regard, the contradiction is evident due to the non-
ratification of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights and 
the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Tribunal.132 
In what concerns international environmental law, refusing to sign 
the Kyoto Protocol and the objective of questioning the scientific ba-
ses of the relationship between global heating and the emission of 
gases, especially C02, goes beyond a legitimate exercise of doubting 
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the fashionable scientific certainties.133 The United States may find 
reasons, for example, in the interest of the country to keep growing at 
higher rates than Europeans and in preventing competition from 
countries such as China that were not linked to gas reduction tar-
gets.134 Something similar happened with the non-ratification of the 
Cartagena Protocol.135 The Cartagena Protocol dealt with farmers and 
the biotechnology industry in the country, with the use of genetically 
modified organisms, and whether they would be harshly impacted 
with the restrictions imposed by the trade.136 
 The problems of geopolitics and economic interests explain 
most of that withdrawal. We cannot forget that part of the interna-
tional legislation for human rights is a direct or indirect consequence 
of North American efforts before the different bodies in the interna-
tional community, and that those efforts were during the time they 
were away from the subject. Thus, the country plays an important 
role in the mobilization of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
to respond to flagrant violations to human rights in different parts of 
the world.137 The country has signed several regional and internation-
al treaties that have the purpose of protecting human rights and the 
environment.138  
 For many, the increasing involvement of the United States in 
order to protect the global environment demonstrates the progressive 
awareness of citizens and leaders regarding not only the severity and 
the importance of the problem, but also moral and economic aware-
ness.139 
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is worth add-
ing to the analysis regarding cooperation and the use of native and 
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traditional technologies among contracting parties. M. Visentin 
teaches when he mentions the Convention: 
Each Contracting Party has to adopt legislative, administrative or 
political measures, as the case may be, to allow for effective partici-
pation in biotechnological research activities of all [p]arts, especially 
[c]ountries under development that provide the research with genetic 
resources and, if possible, within the territory of those Contracting 
Parties.140 
It is important to remember that the CDB, launched in Brazil at 
ECO-92, was not ratified by the United States at that time.141 Ratifi-
cation only happened one year after the Convention. Brazil, a mem-
ber of the CDB, has surprisingly not ratified the Nagoya Protocol, in 
force since October 2014,that sets forth the rules for the fair and equi-
table partition among member countries of benefits from the use of 
genetic resources.142 It is a subject that is clearly favorable to human 
rights. The delay to ratify is due to the great potential of supplying 
genetic resources, which has to be well structured. 
b. Brazil and the International Protection of Human and 
Environmental Rights 
 Brazil’s priority role is played at a regional level,143 although it 
had decided to be more active at a global level, especially in the first 
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ten years of this century.144 That role and protagonism are also 
marked by actions that are not always coherent with the defense of 
human and environmental rights. In the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, with a representation between 2010 and 2011 as well 
as between 2013 and 2014, Brazil has voted in favor of the resolu-
tions that addressed critical situations in several countries such as 
Belarus, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sri-Lanka, and Sudan.145 At the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, still in the first two years, 
the country voted in favor of two resolutions that condemned the vio-
lence of the State of Syria.146 Also in that year, during the Universal 
Periodical Review at Human Rights Council, the country accepted 
159 out of the 170 recommendations, agreeing to adopt measures to 
fight torture and improve the conditions of prisons and of public safe-
ty.147  
 However, the new period at the Council was a step backwards 
and that behavior was repeated within the General Assembly. In 
2013, for example, Brazil abstained from voting for a resolution that 
condemned the violence in Syria, recognizing the Syrian opposition, 
the National Coalition, as “an efficient speaker for a political transi-
tion;” Brazil did the same for the resolution concerning violations to 
human rights in Iran, such as torture and public executions.148 At the 
end of that year, Brazil seemed to have the former positive attitudes 
when it supported a resolution that demanded all parts of Syria to 
stop violations and abuses to human rights and to international hu-
manitarian law.149 Its relative alignment with countries such as Russia 
and China, especially within BRIC, tend to slow down a more con-
sistent external policy for the protection of the rights.150 
 Especially on the environmental field, its work was praised at 
Rio 92 (Section II Conference of the United Nations on Environment 
and Human Development) for defending international cooperation for 
the promotion of fair and sustainable development in the course of a 
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positive agenda, Agenda 21.151  At Rio 20, it promoted the adoption 
of the Objectives of Sustainable Development and of a new global 
indicator, the Inclusive Wealth Report (IWR).152 Brazil also contrib-
uted to the creation of the C-40: groups of cities worldwide, including 
Curitiba, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, with common objectives of 
adopting sustainable urban policies.153 
 Economic interests associated to strategic positions led to 
withdrawals or partial defenses of the environment in the global and 
regional scenarios, similarly to the human rights in general. A picture 
of that scenario may be found in the behavior of the country in face 
of the concession of preventive measures by the Inter American 
Commission for Human Rights, when the groups of native people 
impacted by the project were listened to in order to suspend the con-
struction of the Belo Monte power plant.154 The answer was truculent, 
not only when it classified the conclusions of the Commission as 
“premature and unjustified,” but also when it withdrew its ambassa-
dor at the Organization of American States.155 After that, it proposed 
changes to the inter-American system of human rights that included 
the reduction of the power of the Commission to issue preventive 
measures.156  
 The implementation of the commitments taken over externally, 
including the ones of which it was one of the promoters, still needs to 
be improved. Lack of priority of government planning and continuity, 
allied with the weak participation of the civil society, explains the 
low execution effectiveness regarding environmental objectives and 
targets the country agreed to accomplish. An example can be found in 
the implementation of the Agenda 21 by the cities. Information on the 
environment from IBGE’s “Research Profile of Brazilian Cities” in-
dicates that from the Agenda 21 that existed in 2002, only 20% were 
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still in force, although not forcibly effective by 2012.157 The other 
ones had simply been forgotten.158 
 Large projects such as the transposition of São Francisco River 
or the construction of Belo Monte, and the organization of mega 
events in the country such as the World Cup in 2014 and the Olym-
pics in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, Rodrigo and Carlos José call attention 
to the following: 
Associated to the interest of agro business and mining compa-
nies, mobilized government forces to mitigate the environmental 
rules, promote important interventions to the environment without the 
appropriate inspection of impacts and taking, in some of them, to so-
cial spatial segregation of the urban space (for the construction relat-
ed to the World Cup and the Olympics) and even the rural space with 
the impact and displacement imposed to traditional groups and com-
munities (such as in Belo Monte and the transposition of São Fran-
cisco River).159 
 Nevertheless, successes have been reported. Deforestation has 
reduced by seventy percent between information dated 2013 and the 
average between 1996 and 2005 with the use of measures such as the 
creation of new protected areas in the Amazon. These measures in-
clude native reserves and sustainable use units, and the approval of 
the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal 
Amazonia, besides the work of control bodies, especially the Public 
Prosecutors’ Office.160 
V. Conclusion 
 With the trend to treat the environment at the level of human 
and constitutional rights, it would be fair to think that the protection 
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of that good would be insured in the countries that thus consider it. 
However, that is not true because in the globalized world, states can-
not make environmental policy decisions without taking into account 
international problems and contexts related to it. They consider the 
effectiveness of the measures and also the impacts they are producing 
in their territories. Against that background, we tried to analyze the 
intentions of the United States and Brazil in the international promo-
tion of the right to a healthy environment.  
 The performance of the United States for the international 
promotion of a healthy environment is variable and, nowadays, it is 
shy once its strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests mostly 
guide it. Its protagonism within the United Nations in the 1970’s was 
replaced by reactive attitudes. One example of that was not ratifying 
several conventions, such as the 1989 Basel Convention on the Dis-
posal of Hazardous Waste, the 1992 Biological Diversity Convention, 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and others already mentioned above.161 
 Where there are concerns in environmental law, there also 
tends to be concerns with human rights generally. The United States 
has been adding the promotion of human rights in general and the 
quality of the environment in particular to its external politics speech. 
However, there is an evident contradiction for not ratifying the Inter-
American Convention of Human Rights and the Rome Statute, 
among others.162 But it is also clear that North American citizens are 
getting involved in the defense of the environment with the moral 
awareness of the environmental issues due to economic progress at 
any price. 
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 The participation of Brazil to promote a healthy environment is 
revealed regionally and nationally at a global level also as contradic-
tory. Its external protagonism in the 1990’s was followed by more 
careful and even reactive behavior. Then, internally, it contradicted 
some international commitments and gradually reduced the levels of 
environmental protection. The construction of the Belo Monte power 
plant, the transposition of the S. Francisco River, and the organiza-
tion of mega events such as the World Cup and the Olympics mobi-
lized government forces to mitigate environmental standards.163 Eco-
nomic and strategic reasons were behind that mitigation and even 
disrespect to those already mitigated standards. 
 The United States, in the face of the reduction of tax barriers 
on global trade after the Second World War, helped create the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which had no concern 
about the environment at its basis.164 The decisions made, such as the 
case of Mexico versus United States in 1991 regarding tuna sales and 
dolphin protection, make the preference for the trade subject to clear 
in negotiations between trade and environment.165 
 It was only with the World Trade Organization in 1995 that the 
Committee for Trade and Environment was created to conciliate trade 
and environment protection demands.166 However, even after eight 
Ministerial Conferences for the members of the Organization, there 
were no significant changes to the multilateral trade system regarding 
the protection of the environment. Other negotiation rounds repro-
duced simple rhetoric claims for the promotion of world trade com-
patible with the requirements of sustainable development.  
 One can conclude that the international system for the protec-
tion of human rights has given a fragment treatment to the right to a 
healthy environment, making it difficult to frame it as a kind of hu-
man right and, even more important, to make it effective. Also within 
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the WTO, the submission of the right to a healthy environment to the 
orders of economic logic is recurrent.  
 It is more than time for economic issues to be solved jointly 
with environmental issues once they are the two sides of the same 
coin. International law for human rights has to take over the task to 
define the content and the structure of the right to a healthy environ-
ment and reinforce its institutionalism by establishing mechanisms to 
hold accountable those people, groups, or even states that start envi-
ronmental crises. The WTO has to take the environmental issue seri-
ously when negotiating, adjusting it to stimulate international trade. 
